By Melissa Ayala
On January 23, the First Chamber of the Mexican Court of Justice will discuss one of the most transcendental issues for contemporary law: the recognition of animals as subjects of legal protection. It will do so through the draft judgment of amparo in review 365/2024 prepared by Minister Juan Luis González Alcántara Carrancá, which seeks to consolidate a more robust legal framework against animal abuse and cruelty in Mexico City.
The case has a particularly complex edge: the person challenging Articles 350 Bis and 350 Ter of the Penal Code of Mexico City is a person who professes Santeria, a religious practice that in certain contexts includes the ritual immolation of animals. This argument poses a direct clash between two fundamental principles: religious freedom, enshrined in Article 24 of the Constitution, and the protection of animals as sentient beings, which is protected both in the Political Constitution of our country and in the Constitution of Mexico City.
Freedom of worship is a cornerstone of our democracy. Allowing people to practice their faith without undue interference reflects the cultural and religious plurality that defines our country. However, the central question is: how far does this right go when it involves suffering to living beings? The draft judgment argues that the protection of animal welfare does not constitute a disproportionate interference with freedom of worship. On the contrary, it seeks to balance conflicting rights, ensuring that individual beliefs do not perpetuate practices incompatible with the recognition of animals as subjects of protection.
In Mexico, this discussion tests our legal capacity to address the collision of rights. Recognizing animals as sentient beings does not imply ignoring cultural and religious traditions, but it does imply rethinking them.
An additional element that makes this project transcendental is that it questions the speciesist nature of law. For centuries, laws have exclusively privileged human beings, ignoring the fact that animals are also capable of suffering, feeling and experiencing the world in complex ways. For example, Martha Nussbaum, in her book Justice for Animals: Our Collective Responsibility (2022), proposes a philosophical and ethical framework that challenges traditional speciesist views of law and morality.
According to Nussbaum,humanity has a responsibility to ensure justice for animals, recognizing their capacity to suffer, their interests and their vulnerability to human decisions. Based on her theory of capabilities developed together with Amartya Sen, Nussbaum proposes that justice requires that the fundamental capabilities of animals, such as living without pain, moving freely and developing social relationships with other animals, be protected.
If the bill is approved, it will be a historic advance. The Supreme Court will not only be setting a precedent in animal protection, but also showing that rights are not exclusive, but complementary. Protecting animals is not an affront to faith, and regulating religious practices based on ethical principles does not mean denying our plurality. This case invites us to reflect on the kind of society we want to build: one in which justice includes the most vulnerable, human or not.
*Melissa Ayala is a constitutional lawyer specialized in gender and human rights.

The opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and are absolutely independent of the position and editorial line of the company. Opinion 51.

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