Breathe
By Lourdes Molina
Judicial reform is a fact, it is better to understand it and work to counteract its effects. In this sense, it is pertinent to question whether the reform protects or threatens minorities and democracy in Mexico.
In the context of the question, we start from the idea that an essential part of democracy is to establish limits to the majorities, that the Court is part of the control that protects the value of democracy, safeguarding the voice of the people.
The reform proposes changes in suspensions and the effects of amparo rulings: suspensions may not have general effects in the case of laws, and district judges may not grant amparos with general effects in the case of general rules.
Does this reform protect the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation as a control mechanism that protects minorities and democracy?
Since the court does not disappear, the answer is that it continues as the constitutional body designed as a mechanism for the protection of minorities and democracy, since it is not prevented from requesting constitutional protection and also respects the will of the people, which is exercised through their representatives elected by popular vote. In this way, the division of powers in a democratic state is materialized, without disregarding the rights of minorities before the neutral arbiter, the SCJN, to review the decisions of the other powers and authorities and restore their violated rights.
It should not go unnoticed that current political models treat their adversaries as enemies, intimidate the press, threaten to challenge electoral results, attempt to weaken the institutional defenses of democracy, including the courts, among other bodies, running the risk of reaching authoritarianism by restructuring, for example, the electoral rules, or establishing mechanisms for judicial appointments through the formula of election rather than appointment. This leads us to the following question:
Are we facing the destruction of the institutions that were created under the discourse of strengthening democracy in Mexico, or are we facing a new institutional design to strengthen democracy in Mexico?
It would seem that we are facing the first of the questions, that we are facing the destruction of the institutions that were created to strengthen democracy in Mexico and the rule of law, with the purpose of achieving an authoritarian state through the weakening of the institutions.
I believe that we are facing a new model of government that requires a new institutional design. Under the discourse of the party in power, it seeks to strengthen Mexico's independence through economic autonomy as a nation, with an economically strengthened population and access to the minimum for a dignified life, that is, a society in harmony, a product of social peace.
However, the discourse of the ruling party and the reform advocates seems to update the four key indicators of authoritarian behavior. In How Democracies Die, Levitsky and Ziblatt propose as key indicators of authoritarian behavior: the rejection or weak acceptance of the democratic rules of the game; denial of the legitimacy of political adversaries; tolerance or encouragement of violence; and the predisposition to restrict the civil liberties of the opposition, including the media.
I agree with the authors that the responsibility to prevent authoritarian people from coming to power, more than the court and ministers, is the responsibility of political parties and their leaders, because they are the guardians of democracy. This implies keeping potentially authoritarian leaders off electoral lists, resisting the temptation to appoint extremists to relevant positions despite their popularity, eliminating them from their ranks, avoiding alliances with anti-democratic parties and candidates, adopting measures to systematically isolate extremists far from legitimizing them, and avoiding normalizing or publicly respecting authoritarian figures, and even forming a common front against extremists postulated as strong electoral opponents.
On this basis, it is pertinent to ask the following question: Is this the case in our country? And what are the risks?
The context of the question is in the sense that, in order to sustain the viability of attributing democratic legitimacy to ministers, magistrates and judges through popular vote, it is necessary to have democratic institutions in good condition that allow guaranteeing free and universal elections with an even floor.
The past election is used as an example and the referred question is raised. Since, based on the vote for the presidency and the rest of the candidacies, the people of Mexico have reiterated their desire to try to obtain a change in the model of government, despite factors such as insecurity, which according to statistical numbers has not improved in comparison with previous governments. This is just one example. In that sense, I believe that the same reasons led to the result of the judicial reform and the change in the institutional model so that jurisdictional officials are elected by popular vote. The people want another model of justice. The questions are: What did the justice system contribute to the fact that the people did not come to its defense? And, are we facing the destruction of democracy, since counterweights will be eliminated and minorities will be silenced?
I invite you to join me in this analysis in the next issue.
The opinions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and are absolutely independent of the position and editorial line of the company. Opinion 51.
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